Efficient Algorithms for Scheduling Moldable Tasks

We study the problem of scheduling $n$ independent moldable tasks on $m$ processors that arises in large-scale parallel computations. When tasks are monotonic, the best known result is a $(\frac{3}{2}+\epsilon)$-approximation algorithm for makespan minimization with a complexity linear in $n$ and polynomial in $\log{m}$ and $\frac{1}{\epsilon}$ where $\epsilon$ is arbitrarily small. We propose a new perspective of the existing speedup models: the speedup of a task $T_{j}$ is linear when the number $p$ of assigned processors is small (up to a threshold $\delta_{j}$) while it presents monotonicity when $p$ ranges in $[\delta_{j}, k_{j}]$; the bound $k_{j}$ indicates an unacceptable overhead when parallelizing on too many processors. For a given integer $\delta\geq 5$, let $u=\left\lceil \sqrt[2]{\delta} \right\rceil-1$. In this paper, we propose a $\frac{1}{\theta(\delta)} (1+\epsilon)$-approximation algorithm for makespan minimization with a complexity $\mathcal{O}(n\log{\frac{n}{\epsilon}}\log{m})$ where $\theta(\delta) = \frac{u+1}{u+2}\left( 1- \frac{k}{m} \right)$ ($m\gg k$). As a by-product, we also propose a $\theta(\delta)$-approximation algorithm for throughput maximization with a common deadline with a complexity $\mathcal{O}(n^{2}\log{m})$

A Game-Theoretic Study on Non-Monetary Incentives in Data Analytics Projects with Privacy Implications

The amount of personal information contributed by individuals to digital repositories such as social network sites has grown substantially. The existence of this data offers unprecedented opportunities for data analytics research in various domains of societal importance including medicine and public policy. The results of these analyses can be considered a public good which benefits data contributors as well as individuals who are not making their data available. At the same time, the release of personal information carries perceived and actual privacy risks to the contributors. Our research addresses this problem area. In our work, we study a game-theoretic model in which individuals take control over participation in data analytics projects in two ways: 1) individuals can contribute data at a self-chosen level of precision, and 2) individuals can decide whether they want to contribute at all (or not). From the analyst's perspective, we investigate to which degree the research analyst has flexibility to set requirements for data precision, so that individuals are still willing to contribute to the project, and the quality of the estimation improves. We study this tradeoff scenario for populations of homogeneous and heterogeneous individuals, and determine Nash equilibria that reflect the optimal level of participation and precision of contributions. We further prove that the analyst can substantially increase the accuracy of the analysis by imposing a lower bound on the precision of the data that users can reveal

Linear Regression from Strategic Data Sources

Linear regression is a fundamental building block of statistical data analysis. It amounts to estimating the parameters of a linear model that maps input features to corresponding outputs. In the classical setting where the precision of each data point is fixed, the famous Aitken/Gauss-Markov theorem in statistics states that generalized least squares (GLS) is a so-called "Best Linear Unbiased Estimator" (BLUE). In modern data science, however, one often faces strategic data sources, namely, individuals who incur a cost for providing high-precision data. In this paper, we study a setting in which features are public but individuals choose the precision of the outputs they reveal to an analyst. We assume that the analyst performs linear regression on this dataset, and individuals benefit from the outcome of this estimation. We model this scenario as a game where individuals minimize a cost comprising two components: (a) an (agent-specific) disclosure cost for providing high-precision data; and (b) a (global) estimation cost representing the inaccuracy in the linear model estimate. In this game, the linear model estimate is a public good that benefits all individuals. We establish that this game has a unique non-trivial Nash equilibrium. We study the efficiency of this equilibrium and we prove tight bounds on the price of stability for a large class of disclosure and estimation costs. Finally, we study the estimator accuracy achieved at equilibrium. We show that, in general, Aitken's theorem does not hold under strategic data sources, though it does hold if individuals have identical disclosure costs (up to a multiplicative factor). When individuals have non-identical costs, we derive a bound on the improvement of the equilibrium estimation cost that can be achieved by deviating from GLS, under mild assumptions on the disclosure cost functions.Comment: This version (v3) extends the results on the sub-optimality of GLS (Section 6) and improves writing in multiple places compared to v2. Compared to the initial version v1, it also fixes an error in Theorem 6 (now Theorem 5), and extended many of the result

Dynamic Resource Management in Clouds: A Probabilistic Approach

Dynamic resource management has become an active area of research in the Cloud Computing paradigm. Cost of resources varies significantly depending on configuration for using them. Hence efficient management of resources is of prime interest to both Cloud Providers and Cloud Users. In this work we suggest a probabilistic resource provisioning approach that can be exploited as the input of a dynamic resource management scheme. Using a Video on Demand use case to justify our claims, we propose an analytical model inspired from standard models developed for epidemiology spreading, to represent sudden and intense workload variations. We show that the resulting model verifies a Large Deviation Principle that statistically characterizes extreme rare events, such as the ones produced by "buzz/flash crowd effects" that may cause workload overflow in the VoD context. This analysis provides valuable insight on expectable abnormal behaviors of systems. We exploit the information obtained using the Large Deviation Principle for the proposed Video on Demand use-case for defining policies (Service Level Agreements). We believe these policies for elastic resource provisioning and usage may be of some interest to all stakeholders in the emerging context of cloud networkingComment: IEICE Transactions on Communications (2012). arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1209.515